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Abstract. Over the last twenty five years commodity crop farms have steadily declined in number 
and grown in average size, and production has shifted to larger operations.  During the same 
period,  the  share  of  agricultural  payments  going  to  large  farms  has  increased,  in  large  part 
because payments are tied to actual or historical crop production.  This study evaluates whether 
payments from federal farm programs may have contributed to the concentration of farmland.  
Using  zip  code-level  data  constructed  from  the  micro  files  of  the  1987-2002  Agriculture 
Censuses  the  study  estimates  the  association  between  government  payments  per  acre  and 
subsequent growth in weighted median farmland area.  A semi-parametric generalized additive 
model controls for location and initial concentration levels, and narrows comparisons to nearby 
zip codes with similar average farm sizes.  Findings indicate, both  with and without spatial 
controls,  that  government  payments  are  strongly  associated  with  subsequent  concentration 
growth.   
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1. Introduction 
Over  the  last  twenty  five  years  the  production  of  field  crops  has  become  increasingly 
concentrated on larger farms, as measured by acres.  In major program crop producing counties, 
farms with 1,000 to 10,000 acres increased in number by 50 percent between 1978 and 2002, and 
the total farmland controlled by these large operations increased by almost 48 percent.
1   In 
contrast, over this period farms with less than 1,000 acres declined in number and amount of 
farmland controlled.  The increasing concentration of agricultural production has resulted in an 
increasing share of government payments going to large farms: between 1978 and 2002 the share 
of all payments going to farms with between 1,000 and 10,000 acres increased by 46 percent. 
In  recent  years  some  have  expressed  concern  that  payments  unfairly  advantage  large 
operations.    Some  interest  groups,  politicians,  and  newspaper  editorials  have  argued  that 
government payments are a key factor contributing to the steady growth in average farm size and 
concentration of production (e.g., Becker, 2001; Nelson, 2002; Williams-Derry and Cook, 2000).  
Concerns  about  the  link  between  agricultural  payments  and  farm  size  growth  have  helped 
motivate congressional efforts to tighten payment caps on large-scale producers (USDA, 2003).
2   
Claims that government payments unfairly advantage large farms are usually supported 
with statistics that show the steady growth in farm size and the strong association between farm 
size  and  payment  levels.    However,  while  government  payments  and  production  have  both 
become  increasingly  concentrated,  this  concurrence  of  trends  does  not  prove  a  causal 
relationship between payments and farm size.  The design of government programs that give rise 
to payments are such that payment levels are tied to the amount of land being farmed or to the 
production history of the land.  Consequently, the association between increasing concentration 
of farm size and farm payments is caused, at least in part, by expanding farm size, which could 
                                                 
1 The source and construction of the statistics cited in this paragraph are described in detail in the third section. 
2 In 2002, a Senate amendment to cap payments at $275,000 per farm was dropped in conference with the House.  
Efforts to limit payments continued in 2003, when the Grassley-Dorgan payment limits bill that would have limited 
annual farm subsidy payments to $250,000 ($500,000 for a couple) was introduced (and later dropped). In 2005, 
President Bush proposed payment caps legislation similar in scope to Grassley-Dorgan bill.    3 
be driven by factors other than the distribution of government payments (MacDonald, Hoppe and 
Banker, 2005). 
To  what  extent  are  government  agricultural  programs  and  their  associated  payments 
contributing to the concentration of production?  Most studies that have attempted to explain 
changes in the size and survival of individual farms based on characteristics of the farm operator 
or farm have not considered the role of government payments (Sumner and Leiby, 1987; Hallam, 
1993; Zepeda, 1995; Weiss, 1999; Kimhi and Bollman, 1999).  An exception is a recent study by 
Key and Roberts (2006) that found that the level of  government payments has a significant 
positive effect on the survival rate and duration of individual farm businesses.  However, their 
study, and more generally any study analyzing the effects of payments on the growth or survival 
of individual farms, cannot predict the effects of an increase in payments on aggregate farm 
structure  (e.g.  average  farm  size)  because  these  studies  cannot  account  for  the  influence  of 
payments on farms entering production.  In other words, these studies can test how existing 
farms respond to payments, but not how potential farmers respond.  
Some  past  studies  have  estimated  the  effect  of  agricultural  payments  on  aggregate 
measures  of  farm  structure,  including  the  national  agricultural  bankruptcy  rate  (Shepard  and 
Collins, 1982), the total number of farms (Tweeten, 1993), and average farm size (Huffman and 
Evenson, 2001).  While taking very different approaches, these studies have treated government 
payments as exogenous and have used current payments to explain current indicators of farm 
structure.  A problem with this approach is that it is difficult to attribute a causal mechanism to 
an observed cross-sectional association between payments and farm concentration.  To do so 
requires confidence that factors other than agricultural payments that affect farm structure are 
adequately controlled for.  A particular concern is the great heterogeneity of land and farms 
across regions in the U.S.  For example, if one finds larger farms in areas with higher payments, 
the association might be due to government programs targeting particular field crops that require 
more land to be profitably farmed.  Moreover, causation might go in the opposite direction:   4 
larger  farms  might  have  higher  rates  of  participation  in  government  programs  and  therefore 
receive higher payment levels. 
This  study  compares  payment  levels  to  subsequent  percentage  changes  in  land 
concentration at the zip code level. That is, we examine whether concentration growth rate is 
higher  in  zip  codes  with  higher  historical  payment  levels  relative  to  zip  codes  with  lower 
payment levels.  Even if programs happen to target farms that are larger due to the nature of the 
crops  they  grow,  there  is  no  obvious  reason  to  expect  programs  to  target  farms  inclined  to 
subsequently grow faster over time. In other words, a correlation between payments and the 
subsequent change in land concentration is unlikely to result from reverse causality.   
The study also uses a semi-parametric generalized additive model to control for location 
(using  a  two-dimensional  non-parametrically  estimated  spatial  surface)  and  beginning 
concentration  levels  (using  one-dimensional  non-parametric  surface).    The  spatial  regression 
analysis  narrows  the  comparisons  to  nearby  locations  that  are  likely  to  be  similar  in  many 
respects  besides  payments,  including  land  quality,  climate,  distance  to  markets,  etc.    Local 
variation  in  payment  levels  stem  in  part  from  a  longer  history  of  participation  and  planting 
decisions, which likely varied depending on heterogeneous expectations and participation costs 
of past farm operators.   
Land concentration is measured at the zip code level.  Farmland concentration is defined 
as the acre-weighted median farm size:  the farm size such that half the farmland within each zip 
code resides on larger farms and half resides on smaller farms. The analysis uses micro data from 
the 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 Agricultural Censuses and includes all U.S. zip codes with at 
least three farms.
3  The zip code analysis improves upon national, state, or county level analyses 
by providing more observations and more variation across observations in concentration and 
                                                 
3  More precisely, every zip code where at least three farm operators responded to the Census in each of the four 
Census years.  To protect the confidentiality of farmers’ responses, the data were analyzed on site at the USDA’s 
National  Agricultural  Statistical  Service  (NASS),  the  agency  that  administers  the  Agricultural  Census.    More 
information about the Census of Agriculture can be found at: http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/.   5 
payment  levels.    Sufficient  variation  at  a  local  level  is  important  when  using  an  empirical 
technique that controls for factors that vary geographically, as is clearly the case for agriculture. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical links between 
farm business growth and survival and between government payments and farm structure.  We 
then use data from the Census of Agriculture to provide an overview of farm structure changes 
using data from 1978 to 2002.  The section illustrates how average farm size and concentration 
has  changed  over  time  for  commodity  crop  producers  historically  targeted  by  government 
agricultural  programs,  discusses  alternative  statistical  measures  of  farm  concentration,  and 
argues that the “weighted median” farm size is superior to the mean or median farm size for the 
purpose  of  characterizing  concentration  of  agricultural  production.      The  remaining  sections 
discuss the empirical approach, data, results, and conclusions. 
 
2. Determinants of Concentration: Farm Size and Survival 
Because the amount of U.S. farmland has remained relatively stable over time, changes in land 
concentration  are  ultimately  linked  to  farm  size  and  survival  (Vesterby  et  al.,  2006).  The 
literature on firm size and survival therefore provides some insight into the determinants of farm 
structure. In this literature, the relationship between firm size and survival is often modeled as a 
dynamic process wherein firms (or entrepreneurs) are uncertain about their own competitiveness 
at startup (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1992; and Pakes and Ericson, 1998).  In these 
models, firms gradually learn about their abilities over time and the longer they operate, the more 
they learn about their competitiveness.  As managers revise their perceptions of their firm’s 
ability upward, they tend to expand, while those revising downward tend to contract or exit.  
Thus, the longer a firm has existed, the bigger it will become and the less likely it will be to fail. 
Empirical  studies  generally  confirm  these  theoretical  predictions  (Dunne,  Roberts  and 
Samuelson,  1988;  Baldwin  and  Gorecki,  1991;  Audretsch,  1992;  Audretsch  and  Mahmood, 
1995; among others).   6 
In  general,  theory  does  not  provide  unambiguous  predictions  as  to  how  a  change  in 
government  payments  would  influence  farm  growth  and  survival.    Consider,  for  example,  a 
model of a representative farm where the quantity of agricultural land is fixed, but labor and 
capital are mobile between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (Kislev and Peterson, 1983).  
In this model, farm size is ultimately linked to the ratio of wages to the cost of capital.  Thus, an 
increase in government payments increases returns to farming, but these additional profits are 
capitalized into the price of land.  Hence, a change in government payments has no clear direct 
effect on the cost of labor relative to capital, and therefore has no effect on farm size.  
In more complex economic models that allow for transaction costs and a range of farm 
sizes,  there  arises  a  variety  of  mechanisms  through  which  payments  could  influence  farm 
structure.  For example, if per-acre payments are unequally distributed across farms of different 
sizes then an increase in payments could alter farm structure.  Such a pattern may arise if there 
are fixed transactions costs associated with participation, so that larger farms have a stronger 
incentive to participate than smaller farms do.  Higher payments per-acre for a particular farm 
size group would allow this group to expand and bid up the prices of fixed resources – especially 
land –and cause other size farms to shrink or exit.   
An unequal distribution of total payments might also influence farm size and survival 
through capital or labor market mechanisms. Borrowing constraints could cause a farm’s cost of 
capital to depend on its net worth: farms with greater net worth face lower borrowing costs 
because they have more resources with which to secure a loan (e.g., Hubbard, 1998).  If this were 
the case, an increase in income from government payments would raise the net worth of a farm, 
making it less costly for a farmer to obtain financing to increase farm size.  If large farms are 
credit constrained and small farms are not then an increase in payments causes large farms to 
expand and increase in number, which bids up land prices and causes small farms to shrink and 
decline in number (Key and Roberts, 2005).  If both large and small farms are credit constrained, 
then the effect of an increase in government payments on farm size and survival is ambiguous.   7 
Total  payments  may  also  influence  farm  size  and  survival  by  altering  farm  operator 
labor-leisure decisions through a wealth effect combined with transactions costs. Payments could 
encourage the farmers receiving them to work less; and if there are transaction costs associated 
with hiring labor or finding employment, higher payments may cause a reduction in the supply of 
farm labor (Lopez, 1984; Strauss, 1986).  Less farm labor could mean less production and a 
smaller farm.  However, under certain conditions, a higher shadow wage for farm labor could 
mean greater capital utilization and thus an increase in farm size, as in Kislev and Peterson.
4   
 
3.  Trends in Concentration and Government Payments 
This section provides an overview of farm structural changes over the past quarter century and 
argues that the “weighted median” farm size is superior to the mean or median farm size for the 
purpose of characterizing concentration of agricultural production.   
Table 1 illustrates structural change from 1978 to 2002 in agricultural areas in counties 
where land harvested in the major program commodities represented most cropland harvested.
5  
Restricting the Census information in this way limits the total number of counties to 765, and 
between 655,482 and 882,546 farms (about half of all those reporting), depending on the year.  
The table shows a marked increase in the prevalence of farms with between 1,000 and 10,000 
acres.  Between 1978 and 2002, these large farms increased from 4.6 to 9.3 percent of all farms 
and increased their share of total farmland from 28.6 to 46.5 percent.  The growth in the number 
of these large farms came mainly at the expense of farms with between 50 and 500 acres, which 
shrank as a share of farmland and farms.  Farms with less than 50 acres represented a larger 
share of  all farms (24.2 percent) in 2002 than they did in 1978 (21.0  percent), though they 
                                                 
4 Kislev and Peterson held total labor supply fixed to obtain the result that farm size was linked only to the relative 
costs of labor and capital.   
5  Specifically,  we include those counties  where land harvested in barley, corn (grain), cotton, hay, oats, rice, 
sorghum (grain), soybean, and wheat as measured by NASS represented between 90 and 110 percent of the total 
land harvested in the county as measured by the census in 1987, 1992 and 1997.  The reported land harvested in the 
commodity crops from NASS occasionally exceeded that recorded in the Census.  This could have resulted from 
doublecropping - two crops being planted in one field per year.    8 
decreased in number and share of land farmed over this period.  Farms with more than 10,000 
acres of farmland, declined slightly, though their share of all farmland increased slightly. 
Table 2 presents four measures of the representative farm size from 1978 to 2002 for all 
farms, and for farms with fewer than 10,000 acres.  For all farms, mean farm size increased by 
one-third from 336 acres in 1978 to 449 acres in 2002.  However, median farm size actually 
declined by 8 percent over this period: falling from 160 to 147 acres. The decline in median farm 
size reflects the relative increase in the number of very small farms that was discussed above.
6   
The acre-weighted mean and the acre-weighted median are alternative indicators of land 
concentration.   The weighted mean farm size effectively averages farm sizes over acres rather 
than over farms.  The acre-weighted median is the size of a farm such that half of all farmland is 
controlled by larger farms and half by smaller farms. The weighted mean and weighted median 
are much larger than the unweighted averages, reflecting the fact that large farms control most of 
the farmland.  Table 2 shows that for all farms, the weighted mean declines slightly between 
1978 and 2002, but the weighted median almost doubles. The weighted median indicates that in 
1978 half of all farmland was controlled by farms larger than 690 acres. By 2002, half of all 
farmland was controlled by farms having at least 1360 acres.  
Comparing all farms to farms with less than 10,000 acres (bottom of table 2), we find 
similar patterns over time for the mean, median, and weighted median (the levels are smaller but 
the changes over time are similar). However, the weighted mean, which is more sensitive to 
outliers, displays a different trend: excluding the very large farms, the weighted mean farm size 
increased by 44 percent from 1313 acres in 1978 to 1887 acres in 2002.    
The analysis of changing land concentration in the next section uses the weighted median 
as the measure of land concentration because it tracks concentration better than the mean and 
median  when  the  farm  size  distribution  is  highly  skewed  and  because  it  is  less  sensitive  to 
                                                 
6 The decline in median farm size, despite the increasing concentration of farmland on large operations, might be 
explained in part by the USDA’s definition of a farm as:  “Any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural 
products (crops and livestock) were sold or normally would have been sold during the year under consideration.”  
The $1,000 figure has remained unchanged since the 1974 Census.  If adjusted for inflation using the CPI, the 
comparable number for 2002 would be $3800.   9 
outliers  than  the  weighted  mean.
7    The  weighted  median  is  also  a  standard  measure  of 
concentration within the industrial organization literature (e.g., Hart and Clarke p. 43). 
 
Government Payments 
Table 3 illustrates trends in the level of government payments by farm size category beginning in 
1987,  when  payments  data  are  first  available  from  the  Census  of  Agriculture.    Government 
payments are defined as total payments received for participation in Federal farm programs net 
of payments received for participation in the Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands 
Reserve Program.
8  The level of government payments is closely associated with farm size in all 
observed periods.  Mean government payments per farm increases with farm size up to 10,000 
acres.  In 2002, farms with 1,000-10,000 acres, received a median payment of $14,809 – more 
than double the median payment received by farms with 500-1,000 acres, and about ten times the 
median payment received by farms with 150 to 500 acres. While the nature and level of farm 
payments has changed over time, the level of payments received by large farms continues to 
represent a sizeable contribution to farm household income.  However, over half of all farms 
with less than 150 acres receive no government payments – a fact that has not changed since 
1987. 
As  large  farms  produced  an  increasing  portion  of  total  output,  they  also  received  an 
increasing share of government payments.  The share of total payments going to farms with 
between 1,000 and 10,000 acres rose from 30.6 percent of all payments in 1987 to 44.9 percent 
in 2002.  In contrast, farms with between 150 and 1,000 acres received a smaller share of total 
payments over the same period. Reflecting an increase in the number of small farms, farms with 
fewer than 150 acres received an increasing share of government payments (increasing from 4.7 
                                                 
7 Using the weighted mean in the analysis in the next section yielded similar results to the weighted median. 
8 The 1987, 1992, and 1997 censuses asked respondents for the “total amount received for participation in Federal 
farm programs (not including CCC loans).” Respondents were also asked to provide “how much was received for 
participation in the Conservation reserve program and Wetlands Reserve Program (CRP and WRP)?”  The latter was 
subtracted from the former to obtain the measure of payments used in this study. In 2002, the amount received for 
participation in Federal farm programs other than CCC loans, CRP or WRP was asked directly.    10 
percent of the total in 1987 to 8.4 percent in 2002).  The share of payments received by farms 
with more than 10,000 acres also increased. 
 
4. Empirical Methods 
This study compares the changes between census periods of the farmland concentration in zip 
codes with different levels of government payments per acre.  Zip codes are assigned to six 
discrete categories based on payments-per-acre of farmland.  Discretely categorizing zip codes 
by  payment  levels  allows  for  possible  non-linear  associations  between  payments  and 
concentration growth, and mitigates the statistical influence of any single observation or group of 
observations, making estimates more robust. 
   We  first  estimate  the  simple  relationship  between  concentration  growth  and  the 
payments-per-acre category: 
 
(1)    ∆ci = XiE + εi 
 
where subscript i (omitted below to simplify notation) indexes zip codes, ∆c is the percentage 
change in concentration between censuses ( (c1- c0)/ ½(c1 + c0) ), c0 denotes concentration in the 
beginning year, X is a matrix of indicator variables detonating payment-per-acre categories (one 
element of each row equals 1 and the other elements equal 0), E is a vector of payment-category 
effects and ε is a random error.  
Growth in concentration is expressed as a percentage change in order to scale the growth 
measure  relative  to  initial  concentration  levels.    Differencing  controls  for  time-invariant 
heterogeneity and, for the two-year panels used here (described below), this is equivalent to 
using a fixed effect for each zip code area.
9   
                                                 
9 The model in levels would be cit = ai + XitE + νit, where t indexes the two time periods (0,1) and ai is zipcode i’s 
fixed effect (time-invariant idiosyncratic variation).  Differencing over time gives equation 1, with εi
 = νi1 - νi0.  The 
fixed effect, which is constant over the time periods, drops out.     11 
Although comparison of changes in land concentration controls for time-invariant factors 
that might lead to non-causal associations between farm size and payments, the approach is not 
infallible.  It could be that corn, wheat, and cotton and other crop farms traditionally targeted by 
programs have coincidently experienced greater growth in concentration for reasons other than 
government  programs.    For  example,  there  may  have  been  more  technological  change  in 
cultivation of these crops as compared to non-program crops.  To address this concern, we use a 
semi-parametric regression, called a generalized additive model, to control for zip code location 
and initial concentration (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990; Hastie, 1992).  This model has been used 
in a similar fashion by Gibbons (2004) to estimate the costs of urban property crime and by Pope 
et.al (2002) to estimate health effects of long-term exposure to fine particulate air pollution, 
among many other applications.  To our knowledge there have been no applications of this 
model in agricultural economics. 
With controls, the model has the form: 
 
(2)    ∆ci = XiE + f(xi,yi) + g(c0i) + εi 
 
where f(x,y) is a smooth function of zip code centroids (x, y), g(c0) is a smooth function of c0.  
One may think of the smooth surface f(x, y) as ‘smoothed’ location fixed effects.  Using state 
fixed effects would create false discontinuities at zip codes near state borders, which could create 
bias.  The  smooth  non-parametric  surface  eliminates  sharp  discontinuities  in  fixed  effects 
between  adjacent  zip  codes.    Similarly,  we  estimate  a  smooth  function  of  beginning 
concentration levels g(c0).   
The  smooth  functions  were  estimated  using  “loess”,  short  for  “local  polynomial 
regression,” which fits the smooth functions by estimating polynomial functions using points 
local  to  each  fitted  point,  with  local  points  weighted  more  heavily  than  further  points.  The   12 
smooth  functions  are  estimated  jointly  with  E  using  a  Gauss-Seidel  backfitting  method,  as 
described and implemented by Hastie.  See this reference for more details about the procedure.
10   
The key modeling decision concerns the share of points considered local to each fitted 
point on the smooth functions.  For our models, each point on the smooth spatial surface was 
estimated using 5 percent of the zip codes, which is the smallest share that was computationally 
feasible for the two-dimensional spatial surface.  For consistency, we used the same share for the 
one-dimensional  concentration  function.    The  software  package  used  was  the  public  domain 
package ‘R’ with the ‘gam’ package by Hastie (see www.r-project.org). 
With respect to the control variables (location and initial concentration) the generalized 
additive model is very flexible.  A potential shortcoming to using such a flexible model is that it 
can use so many degrees of freedom that it is not possible to identify the model.  This is not a 
problem in our application because we have many observations (21,922 zip codes in each panel).  
A second possible shortcoming is the lack of parametric structure, which can make reporting 
tangible results difficult.  For this application, this feature is a strength rather than a weaknesses.  
The purpose of using these non-parametric controls is to check the robustness of our estimates to 
specification  of  the  controls,  so  making  the  controls  as  flexible  as  possible  lends  greater 
credibility to the estimated effects of payments.   
There are likely two principle sources of the variation in payments per-acre across zip 
codes that allow us to identify the effect of payments on concentration growth.  One source is 
broad regional differences in crop mix and yields – some crops have higher associated payments 
than  others  and  areas  with  historically  higher  yields  receive  higher  payments.    The  non-
parametric functions of location and initial farm size likely remove most variation in payment 
levels caused by differences in crop mix and yield.  The second source of variation, much of 
which remains after controls for location and farm size, is differences in historical patterns of 
                                                 
10 Briefly, the backfitting algorithm first fits the parametric components of  the model and then uses the residuals to 
estimate the first additively separable non-parametric function; the residuals from non-parametric estimates are then 
used  to  estimate  the  second  non-parametric  function;  the  parametric  components  are  then  re-estimated  by 
subtracting the fitted values of the two non-parametric function from the dependent variables; and so on, iterating 
until estimated values on successive iterations converge.   13 
participation in government programs.  In the late 1980’s, program participation came with many 
restrictions: it required farmers to limit their plantings to a share of acres historically planted and 
required a certain portion to be set-aside (left fallow).  Farmers with environmentally fragile land 
(e.g.,  highly  erodible)  were  required  to  follow  certain  management  practices  to  limit 
environmental damages stemming from their cropping activities.
11  These costly participation 
restrictions limited participation somewhat.  Some farmers may have strategically chosen not to 
participate in order to build ‘base’ (payment-qualifying) acres in anticipation of higher future 
payments.  Because payments are tied to historical plantings, and participation required farmers 
to limit plantings, some may have chosen not to participate in order to expand acreage and 
expected future payments. Because payments in future years were tied to historical plantings and 
participation, and historical participation varied somewhat across producers, so do payments.
12  
The second source of identification differs markedly from the first source and does not have 
obvious  links  to  non-payment  drivers  of  growth.    By  estimating  the  relationship  between 
payments and concentration growth with and without the controls, we are able to consider two 
sources of identification.  
 
5. Data 
Measures of land concentration and government payments are constructed at the zip code level 
using individual farm-level data from the Census of Agriculture. The zip code is used as the unit 
of analysis because it is the smallest geographic area that can be associated with individual 
farms.  The data include all zip codes recorded in the Census of Agriculture that had at least 
three  farms  in  each  of  the  four  census  years  examined  (1987,  1992,  1997,  and  2002).  The 
analysis begins in 1987 because that is the first year farm-specific data on government payments 
are available.  
                                                 
11 See Claasen et al. for a description of these cross compliance provisions. 
12 See Young et. al for a description of government programs and how they have evolved over the last twenty years.   14 
An important consideration when using zip code regions as observational units is that zip 
codes can change over time (Blodgett, 2005).  Most zip code changes have occurred in relatively 
urban  areas  that  have  experienced  rapid  population  growth  and  where  agriculture  is  less 
prevalent, which mitigates the importance of the issue somewhat for our analysis.  Zip codes 
usually change by splitting into two or more zip codes, with one of the new areas retaining the 
old code and the other(s) assigned a new code.  Because we restrict our analysis to zip codes 
appearing in all four censuses, farms in areas where zip codes changed are omitted.  Some farms 
in our analysis may be in zip codes that were split, and therefore decreased in size, between 1987 
and 2002.  These changes, however, should not be systematically related to payments per acre or 
the land concentration measure, which do not depend on the size of the zip code region. 
The Census of Agriculture reported farms in 32,959 zip codes in 1987, 34,202 in 1992, 
34,408 in 1997, and 33,548 in 2002.  These counts compare to a nationwide total of about 43,000 
zip  codes  currently  in  the  U.S.    Our  sample  includes  21,922  zip  codes  for  the  analysis  of 
farmland concentration.  Although our sample drops about one third of all zip codes, it drops a 
much smaller share of the total number of farms.  Our sample includes 1,719,392, 1,527,210, 
1,543,905, and 1,343,807 farms in the four sequential Census years, compared to 1,799,926, 
1,621,263 1,653,098 and 1,486,895 farms in the raw Census files. 
For each zip code, we measure “concentration” as the acre-weighted median farmland - 
the farm size at the midpoint of the farmland acreage array such that half the acres in the zip 
code  reside  on  larger  farms  and  half  resides  on  smaller  farms.      Figure  1  shows  zip  code 
frequency distributions of farmland (and cropland) concentration for each of the Census years 
from  1987  to  2002.    The  horizontal  axis  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  weighted  median 
farmland and the vertical axis is the estimated density.
13  We use the logarithm of land size 
because the size distribution of farms is highly skewed and the logarithm is more closely bell-
                                                 
13  The  distributions  were  estimated  with  a  kernel  density  estimator  using  the  software  program  ‘R’(  http://r-
project.org/ ).  The estimates use the default bandwidth of the function “density,” which is 0.9 times the minimum of 
the standard deviation and the interquartile range divided by 1.34 times the sample size to the negative one-fifth 
power.   15 
shaped and therefore easier to discern changes at higher end of the distribution.   Over time, the 
distributions shift markedly to the right, particularly above 5 (equivalent to about 150 acres), 
illustrating  the  shift  in  farming  to  larger  operations.    For  relatively  small  farm  sizes,  the 
distribution  changes  little.    These  farms  are  mainly  “residential  lifestyle”  farms  with  little 
production and little or no government payments.   
For each zip code, the measure of the potential influence of government programs is total 
payments divided by total farmland area.  Defining the payment level on a per-acre basis creates 
a standardized measure that is not sensitive to zip code size – which varies widely across the 
U.S.   
We  organize  the  data  into  three  five-year  panels  corresponding  to  the  time  between 
censuses  (1987-1992,  1992-1997,  and  1997-2002).    We  also  construct  a  “long  panel”  by 
averaging  the  values  of  all  three  panels  (1987-2002).  Zip  codes  are  sorted  into  six  groups 
according to payment per acre in the initial  year of the two-period panels (1987, 1992, and 
1997).  The first group includes those zip codes with zero government payments; the remaining 
zip codes are sorted into five equal-sized quintiles.  For the long panel, zip codes are sorted into 
similar  groups,  except  according  to  the  three-period  average  of  initial  payments.
14    Table  4 
reports the portion of zip codes, farms and land in each of the payment groups.   
 
6. Results 
Table 5 illustrates how initial government payments per acre are associated with subsequent 
changes in farmland concentration for the three panel periods.  For example, the first row shows 
how farmland concentration changed between 1987 and 1992 according to 1987 payments per-
acre category.  The table also illustrates the long run relationship between payments and land 
concentration by comparing average payments per acre for each zip code in 1987, 1992 and 1997 
with average percentage growth in concentration from 1987-1992, 1992-1997, and 1997-2002.  
                                                 
14 Before averaging payments, they were put into constant dollars using the consumer price index.  Using nominal 
dollars or dollars deflated by the producer price index has little influence on the results.   16 
All the panels generally indicate increasing concentration growth for higher payment levels, and 
the relationship is strongest and clearest in the fifteen-year panels. In the long panels, zip codes 
are more likely to be classified into their appropriate payment group (since payments can vary 
from year to year and in the long panel payments are averaged over three years rather than a 
single year).  Consequently, the long panels might provide the most reliable information about 
the relationship between payments and concentration. 
Table 6 reports estimated concentration growth rates for the same panels and groups as 
table  5,  except  the  estimates  include  controls  for  beginning-year  concentration  levels  and 
location using the generalized additive model.  As compared to table 5, these estimates restrict 
comparisons  between  proximate  zip  codes  that  have  similar  initial  concentration  rates.    The 
addition  of  controls  changes  the  estimates  somewhat,  but  a  similar  pattern  remains.    For 
farmland, the estimated difference in concentration between the first and fifth quintiles decreases 
from 33.2 to 27.2 percentage points. 
A  summary  of  the  fitted  model  is  reported  in  table  7,  excluding  the  parametric 
components, which are reported in table 5. The F-values indicate that the null hypothesis that the 
smoothed functions should not be included in the model is strongly rejected.
15  
Assuming we can interpret the association between payments and concentration growth 
as causal, how much of the observed concentration change would be attributed to payments from 
agricultural programs?  Answering requires an estimate of how much concentration would have 
grown without payments.  Results from table 6 imply that if there were no payments, farmland 
concentration would have declined by about 8 percentage points between 1987 and 2002.  This 
estimate  may  be  misleading,  however,  because  there  are  relatively  few  zip  codes  with  no 
payments, and these zip codes are likely quite different from those with positive payments – 
                                                 
15 The F-tests use  “nonparametric degrees of  freedom”  which  may be interpreted as the equivalent number of 
parameters required for the estimated smooth function.  More formally, the smooth function can be formulated as a 
linear combination of the observed responses so that for some matrix A,  c A c ∆ = ∆ ˆ .  Because the matrix A serves 
the same role the projection matrix in linear regression, nonparametric degrees of freedom for the model are defined 
as the trace of A.   17 
which would explain the sharp difference in concentration growth between the zero payment 
group and the first quintile.  An alternative way to predict concentration growth in the absence of 
payments  is  to  extrapolate  using  information  about  farms  receiving  payments.    Rather  than 
breaking  farms  into  discrete  groups,  this  approach  assumes  that  the  effect  of  payments  on 
concentration varies linearly with payments.  The linearity assumption seems reasonable given 
the  proportionately  increasing  effect  of  payments  across  payment  quintiles.  To  this  end,  we 
estimate the model: 
 
(3)         ∆ci = α + βpi + f(xi,yi) + g(c0i) + εi , 
 
where pi indicates payments per acre in zip code i, β is the average marginal effect of payments 
on  concentration  growth,  and  the  rest  of  the  model  is  as  specified  as  in  (2).  To  predict 
concentration in the absence of payments, we multiply the estimate of β by the average value of 
pi and subtract this amount from the average predicted concentration growth. 
The  linear  extrapolation  implies  that,  in  the  absence  of  payments,  average  farmland 
concentration would have increased by 7.9 percent in the absence of payments as compared to an 
observed growth of 17.4 percent, so payments explain more than half the growth.
16   
 
7. Conclusions 
Agricultural structural change over the last few decades can be characterized, in part, by crop 
production shifting to larger operations.  The share of total farmland controlled by large-scale 
operations has steadily increased, while the share controlled by medium-scale operations has 
                                                 
16 The zip code farmland concentration growth (17.4 %) is considerably smaller than the concentration growth 
reported in table 2 (63.9 % between 1987 and 2002).  One reason for the apparent discrepancy is that the statistics 
reported in table 2 are only for farms in counties where a considerable portion of the land is in commodity crops 
historically targeted by government programs, whereas the zip code analysis includes all of the U.S.  As we have 
shown, the targeted areas have experienced far more concentration growth than other agricultural areas.  A second 
reason for the discrepancy is that the weighted median is estimated for all farms in table 2, whereas it is averaged 
over zip codes in the regression analysis. 
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declined.    Though  many  factors  likely  contribute  to  the  increased  concentration  of  land, 
including  changes  in  technology  and  factor  prices,  concerns  have  been  expressed  that 
government payments to farmers have contributed to this phenomenon.   
This  study  is  the  first  to  examine  the  effect  of  agricultural  payments  on  subsequent 
changes in farm size using fine-scale regional (zip code) panel data.  The analysis considers two 
plausibly exogenous sources of variation in government payments: 1) broad regional variation 
crop types and yields caused by soil and climate variation, and 2) local variation resulting from 
differences in ‘base acreage’ (program participation). The very large data set – the sample of all 
agricultural zip codes with three or more farms - permits comparisons across very similar regions 
using  a  semi-parametric  spatial  regression  analysis  that  controls  for  location  and  initial  land 
concentration.    By  examining  how  payments  affect  subsequent  concentration  change,  the 
approach controls for time-invariant factors that might be correlated with government payments 
and  structural  change.  While  payments  could  be  correlated  with  farm  size  for  a  number  of 
reasons, it is less likely that payments would be spuriously correlated with farm size growth, 
especially after controlling for location and initial farm size.  However, it is not possible to know 
with certainty whether there remain factors that have not been controlled for. This is a standard 
caveat to measuring program effects when program participation is not randomly assigned.   
Findings  indicate  that  both  broadly  and  locally,  there  is  a  strong  positive  association 
between government payments and the subsequent change in farm concentration (as measured by 
the acre-weighted median farmland).  The evidence is striking, particularly because the marginal 
association between payments and concentration growth remains even when comparing nearby 
zip codes having similar initial concentration measures.   The study also finds that government 
payments explain about half of the observed growth in farmland concentration. 
Because the relationship between payments and concentration growth is maintained after 
including flexible non-parametric controls, it is not clear what omitted variables could confound 
a  causal  interpretation  of  these  results.    However,  it  is  equally  difficult  to  pin  down  the 
fundamental economic forces that appear to create a link between payments and concentration   19 
growth.  One possibility is that there are significant increasing returns to scale in agricultural 
production and that government payments, which provide cash and perhaps also a means to 
leverage greater resources from lending institutions, relieve liquidity constraints and allow some 
farms to transition more quickly to an efficient scale. This explanation would be consistent with 
studies finding increasing returns to scale (e.g., Morrison Paul and Nehring, 2005; Morrison et 
al., 2004) and liquidity constraints in agriculture (e.g., Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Hubbard 
and Kashyap, 1992; Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, 2000; Roberts and Key, 2002). 
Because  this  is  the  first  study  to  examine  the  relationship  between  payments  and 
subsequent  concentration  growth,  it  is  prudent  to  consider  alternative  explanations  for  these 
findings.  For example, some of the local variation in payments may be due to local variation in 
program “base yields,” which were fixed in 1985.  Areas with higher base yields probably also 
have better land quality (flatter, more fertile soil, etc.). If scale-enhancing technological change 
favored higher quality land relative to lower quality land for same crop, this may provide an 
alternative explanation for our findings at the local level.  However, technological change would 
also have to favor higher-valued field crops relative to lower-valued crops (e.g., cotton over corn 
over wheat) to explain the observed association at a broader level. A technological effect of this 
kind would seem coincidental, but given magnitude and novelty of these findings, this and other 
explanations are worth exploring. 
If the findings are not spurious—that is, if there is indeed a causal effect of payments on 
concentration growth—they suggest that a cap on total payments may reduce the rate of land 
concentration  with  a  commensurate  reduction  in  the  growth  of  farm  sizes.    The  normative 
implications of such a policy remain unclear, however.  For example, if liquidity constraints 
coupled with increasing returns to scale provide the fundamental explanation for these findings 
(one of several possible explanations), this suggests a payment cap would reduce production 
efficiency.  A complete assessment of such a policy would need to balance the loss in efficiency 
against  any  perceived  social  benefits  resulting  from  a  reduction  in  concentration  growth.    20 
Although  our  findings  may  indicate  the  magnitudes  of  the  potential  tradeoffs,  they  do  not 
measure the social benefits of such a policy. 
The change in concentration from one period to the next depends on the size of farms that 
survive, how much they grow if they survive, and on the sizes of new, entering farms.   Future 
work could try to develop a better understanding of how payments might be leading to higher 
concentration  levels  by  examining  how  payments  affect  the  probability  of  individual  farm 
survival, the expected size of the farm if it does survives (how much it grows over time), the 
probability that potential farmers begin farming, and the scale of new farms.  These farm-level 
analyses  would  complement  the  findings  of  the  zip  code-level  analysis  and  provide  further 
insight into how payments alter farm structure.   21 
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Table 1. Farmland and Number of Farms by Farm Size Category, 1978-2002 
 
Farmland Categories 
1978  1982  1987  1992  1997  2002 
Pct. Change 
1978-2002 
0-50 Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  3.540  3.505  3.115  2.932  3.091  2.984  -15.7 
     (Percent of total)  (1.4)  (1.5)  (1.3)  (1.3)  (1.3)  (1.3)  -7.1 
     Farms  184,964  208,751  195,166  185,833  177,248  158,590  -14.3 
     (Percent of total)  (21.0)  (25.3)  (23.7)  (24.5)  (24.5)  (24.2)  15.4 
50-150 Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  19.224  16.980  15.386  13.770  13.826  12.230  -36.4 
     (Percent of total)  (7.4)  (7.1)  (6.4)  (5.9)  (5.9)  (5.2)  -29.9 
     Farms  233,477  220,530  208,745  192,031  188,831  165,998  -28.9 
     (Percent of total)  (26.5)  (26.8)  (25.3)  (25.4)  (26.1)  (25.3)  -4.3 
150-500 Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  80.933  70.563  62.777  54.118  48.904  41.773  -48.4 
     (Percent of total)  (31.0)  (29.5)  (26.2)  (23.2)  (21.0)  (17.6)  -43.1 
     Farms  335,455  304,701  288,292  250,943  226,091  195,104  -41.8 
     (Percent of total)  (38.0)  (37.0)  (35.0)  (33.1)  (31.3)  (29.8)  -21.7 
500-1,000 Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  51.318  48.798  50.607  47.585  44.788  39.874  -22.3 
     (Percent of total)  (19.7)  (20.4)  (21.2)  (20.4)  (19.2)  (16.8)  -14.4 
     Farms  86,472  80,192  88,233  82,321  79,409  73,170  -15.4 
     (Percent of total)  (9.8)  (9.7)  (10.7)  (10.9)  (11.0)  (11.2)  13.9 
1,000-10,000 Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  74.573  73.224  78.441  85.404  93.573  109.984  47.5 
     (Percent of total)  (28.6)  (30.6)  (32.8)  (36.6)  (40.2)  (46.5)  62.5 
     Farms  40,789  37,840  42,409  45,071  50,337  61,218  50.1 
     (Percent of total)  (4.6)  (4.6)  (5.1)  (6.0)  (7.0)  (9.3)  102.1 
10,000+ Acres               
     Farmland (m. ac.)  31.166  29.204  28.862  29.704  28.753  29.863  -4.2 
     (Percent of total)  (12.0)  (12.2)  (12.1)  (12.7)  (12.3)  (12.6)  5.6 
     Farms  1,389  1,144  1,175  1,282  1,221  1,402  1.0 
     (Percent of total)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.21)  35.9 
               
Total farmland (m.ac.)  260.754  242.273  239.187  233.514  232.935  236.709  -9.2 
Total farms  882,546  853,158  824,020  757,481  723,137  655,482  -25.7 
               
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes farms located program crop producing counties (see text for 
details).  25 
Table 2. Representative Farm Size, Various Measures, 1978-2002 
 
1978  1982  1987  1992  1997  2002 
Pct. Change 
1978-2002 
               
All farms               
     Mean  336.0  338.3  361.9  389.9  401.0  449.0  33.7 
     Median  160  153  158  157  148  147  -8.1 
     Weighted Mean  9588.4  9498.4  9573.5  9703.1  9909.0  9148.7  -4.6 
     Weighted Median  690  743  830  968  1080  1360  97.1 
               
Farms < 10,000 Ac.               
     Mean  296.8  298.6  319.5  342.2  353.1  394.9  33.1 
     Median  160  153  157  156  147  146  -8.8 
     Weighted Mean  1313.3  1344.4  1393.9  1529.9  1632.3  1887.2  43.7 
     Weighted Median  567  609  685  790  880  1100  94.0 
               
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes farms located program crop producing counties (see text for 
details).   26 
Table 3. Government Payments by Farm Size Category, 1987-2002 
 
Farmland Categories 
1987  1992  1997  2002 
Pct. Change 
1987-2002 
0-50 Acres           
     Mean ($)  190.1  113.9  309.4  383.0  101.5 
     Median ($)  0  0  0  0  0.0 
     Sum (m. $)  29.3  16.2  43.8  50.3  71.6 
     (Percent of total)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (2.1)  (2.0)  201.5 
50-150 Acres           
     Mean ($)  1067.7  525.7  926.0  1198.0  12.2 
     Median ($)  0  0  0  0  0.0 
     Sum (m. $)  176.0  77.8  138.7  159.6  -9.3 
     (Percent of total)  (4.0)  (3.9)  (6.5)  (6.4)  59.4 
150-500 Acres           
     Mean ($)  6140.1  2593.0  3084.8  3794.9  -38.2 
     Median ($)  3100  650  1553  1454  -53.1 
     Sum (m. $)  1394.8  507.2  548.6  577.7  -58.6 
     (Percent of total)  (31.6)  (25.6)  (25.9)  (23.0)  -27.2 
500-1,000 Acres           
     Mean ($)  19346.7  8147.4  8678.0  9611.4  -50.3 
     Median ($)  15435  6475  7100  6736  -56.4 
     Sum (m. $)  1429.1  563.0  561.1  548.7  -61.6 
     (Percent of total)  (32.4)  (28.4)  (26.5)  (21.9)  -32.5 
1,000-10,000 Acres           
     Mean ($)  34302.5  18500.0  17521.7  21727.1  -36.7 
     Median ($)  27000  13620  14000  14809  -45.2 
     Sum (m. $)  1350.9  787.8  804.4  1125.5  -16.7 
     (Percent of total)  (30.6)  (39.8)  (38.0)  (44.9)  46.4 
10,000+ Acres           
     Mean ($)  23753.8  21532.6  16806.0  34057.6  43.4 
     Median ($)  0  1500  1800  11406  - 
     Sum (m. $)  27.9  27.6  20.5  46.6  66.9 
     (Percent of total)  (0.6)  (1.4)  (1.0)  (1.9)  193.3 
           
Total payments (m. $)  4408.0  1979.6  2117.1  2508.5  -43.1 
           
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes farms located program crop producing counties (see text for 
details).   27 
Figure 1. Probability distributions of average zipcode farm size (weighted-median cropland and 
farmland) 
 





Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes all zip codes with at least three operations reporting in every year.   28 
Table 4. Distribution of Zip Codes, Farms, and Farmland by Payments-Per-Acre Category 
 
  Payments per Acre of Farmland in Beginning Year 
Panel Years   No Payments  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
             
1987-1992             
     Payments per acre  0  0.01-1.06  1.07-4.18  4.19-10.90  10.91-22.41  >22.41 
     % of zip codes  9.4  18.1  18.1  18.1  18.1  18.1 
     % of farms  2.3  15.8  19.7  20.0  21.1  21.1 
     % of farmland  3.5  21.7  17.7  19.5  20.2  17.4 
1992-1997             
     Payments per acre  0  0.01-0.65  0.66-2.12  2.13-4.87  4.88-9.29  >9.29 
     % of zip codes  10.7  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9 
     % of farms  2.8  18.1  20.4  19.5  20.6  18.7 
     % of farmland  2.1  22.6  18.4  18.6  20.0  18.3 
1997-2002             
     Payments per acre  0  0.01-0.58  0.59-1.98  1.99-4.69  4.70-9.11  >9.11 
     % of zip codes  9.8  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0 
     % of farms  2.5  16.5  20.2  20.1  21.1  19.7 
     % of farmland  2.7  24.1  17.5  19.4  19.3  17.0 
Long panel              
     Payments per acre  0  0.01-0.82  0.83-2.71  2.72-6.73  6.74-13.92  >13.93 
     % of zip codes  3.0  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4 
     % of farms  0.1  14.9  20.4  19.8  21.4  23.0 
     % of farmland  0.4  23.8  18.6  18.2  20.0  19.0 
             
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes all zip codes with at least three operations reporting in every year.  
Note: Payments in 1997 dollars using the consumer price index.  For the Long Panel, payments per acre are the 
average of 1987, 1992, and 1997 payments per acre, adjusted to 1997 dollars before averaging.   29 
Table 5. The Percentage Change in Zip Code Farmland Concentration (Weighted-Median 
Farmland) by Payments Per-Acre Category without Controls 
 
  Payments per Acre of Farmland in Beginning Year 
Panel Years  No Payments  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
             
1987-1992             
Concentration change (%)  5.5  -0.1  4.6  6.6  10.4  14.4 
(Standard error)  (1.2)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.8) 
1992-1997             
Concentration change (%)  1.0  -4.3  -2.7  2.4  6.0  10.3 
(Standard error)  (1.1)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.8)  (0.9) 
1997-2002             
Concentration change (%)  2.2  1.4  3.6  7.7  12.9  15.0 
(Standard error)  (1.2)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9) 
Long panel (1987-2002)             
Concentration change (%)  -2.4  4.7  6.1  12.5  26.1  37.9 
(Standard error)  (2.7)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1)  (1.1) 
             
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes all zip codes with at least three operations reporting in every year.  
Note:  Concentration is defined as the weighted median farmland in each zip code (see text for discussion). For each 
zip code and panel, the percent-change in concentration is calculated as 100 times the change in concentration 
divided by average concentration in the two years considered.  For the long panels (1987-2002), the percentage 
change is calculated as the sum of percentage changes for the individual panels.  Payment quintiles are calculated 
using payments per acre of farmland in the beginning panel year for all zip codes reporting positive government 
payments in the beginning year.  For the long panels, quintiles are calculated using the sum of payments-per-acre in 
1987, 1992, and 1997. Because zip codes are sometimes classified into different payment categories in different 
panels, the percentage change for the long panel may not equal the sum of the individual panels. 
  
    30 
Table 6. The Percentage Change in Zip Code Farmland Concentration (Weighted-Median 
Farmland) by Payments Per-Acre Category with Controls 
 
  Payments per Acre of Farmland in Beginning Year 
Panel Years  No Payments  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
             
1987-1992             
Concentration change (%)  6.8  11.4  11.6  13  17.7  24.4 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7) 
1992-1997             
Concentration change (%)  3.6  11.3  9.9  14.7  19.9  25.6 
(Standard error)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7) 
1997-2002             
Concentration change (%)  4.1  10.2  7.5  13.3  21.7  28.2 
(Standard error)  (0.8)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.8) 
Long panel (1987-2002)             
Concentration change (%)  -7.8  11.9  6.7  11  24.1  39.1 
(Standard error)  (1.4)  (0.8)  (0.8)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.9) 
             
 
Source: Census of Agriculture. Sample includes all zip codes with at least three operations reporting in 
every year.  
Note:  See the notes to Table 5 for definitions.  This table reports estimated effects of payment quintiles 








Table 7.  Summary of GAM Estimates  
  Non-parametric Function 
  Initial Farmland 
Concentration 
Location  
(Spatial Surface)  Goodness of Fit 
  Degrees of 
Freedom  F-Value  Degrees of 
Freedom  F-Value  Adj. R
2 
Est. 
Var( ) ε  
             
1987-1992  37.6  123.6  72.3  23.1  0.172  0.232 
1992-1997  38.0  131.1  72.3  23.9  0.170  0.240 
1997-2002  37.9  115.6  72.3  26.7  0.173  0.279 
Long panel (1987-2002)  37.6  171.9  72.3  41.2  0.287  0.379 
             
 
Note:  Estimates and standard errors for the parametric components of the models (the payment per acre category 
fixed effects) are reported in Table 6.   
 
 
 